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Abstract 
Thirty years on from the dramatic and unprecedented AIDS advertising campaign organised 
by the Conservative administration of the late 1980s, this article reassesses the 
experience drawing upon subsequent memoirs and interviews. It does so in the context of 
an emergence of risk politics in the UK in the 1980s, situated within an historical 
perspective on the development of risk within modernity.  Emphasis is placed upon the 
forgotten pragmatic, amoral core of the campaign which challenged the illiberal climate 
of the times, and how it was possible for an administration defined by high moralism to 
challenge it. The range of pressures that led to the campaign are outlined, including a 
conscious attempt to limit stigmatisation amidst the mood of wartime emergency that 
prevailed in late 1986/early 1987. Its emergency character meant little direct legacy of 
harm reduction has endured, but the article argues for a wider significance of the 





Introduction: Historical Perspectives and the Emergence of a Politics of Risk 
 
 
Socially oriented risk research or ¶risk studies· has developed but remains a disparate field 
lacking shape and definition (Burgess, Alemanno and Zinn 2016). A clearer historical 
foundation can provide a thread to help cohere the research area. This article suggests 
that the ¶Don·t die of ignorance· campaign can usefully be understood in an historical 
context, as part of a shift towards a politics of risk that emerged first in the United States 




The politics of risk involve an expanded social agenda around controlling the future and 
emphasizing security and precaution (Franklin 1997). In the famous phrase of Beck (1992: 
48), the ¶risk society· is concerned with the ¶distribution of bads, not goods·; alongside 
classical political concerns with the distribution and allocation of resources, national 
security and social order, the avoidance of new potential harms becomes an imperative. In 
the process, matters of everyday risk and ontological security become politicized, 
contested and engage the public. This process has not developed evenly or completely, 
and nor has intellectual attention; whilst developments in the American context are a 
continuing focus (see for example Mohun 2012; Levy 2012; Vogel 2012), very little has 




The AIDS campaign was one moment in this shift, as lifestyle risk became the subject of 
direct ministerial engagement and the public were implored to change their behaviour 
through an evidence-based campaign challenging then still powerful moral antipathy 
towards homosexuality. Its significance remains unappreciated, however, as the campaign 
is remembered for its shocking advertisements more than historical novelty and shift from 
morally-determined to risk-driven politics. Before exploring the dynamics of the 
campaign, weI will establish that a general historical perspective is important to the 
sociological engagement with risk but did not extend to consider contemporary changes 
within the ¶risk society·. Further, risk politics were not preordained general developments 
of the kind described in sociological theory but involve complex interplay and influential 
actors sometimes pushing against predominant assumptions, requiring the kind of detailed 
analysis of the AIDS campaign that form the core of this article.  
 
A long-term historical perspective was central to the modern foundation of sociological risk 
theory in the 1980s, where modernity was seen as synonymous with a secular orientation 
towards the future. The fate, luck and fortune that dominated pre-modern societies was 
eroded and marginalised, and Giddens (1991: 145) suggests the domination of the abstract 
system of risk calculation meant the ¶evaporation of morality·. This transition was not an 
overnight or complete break with the past, however, particularly at an uneven, global 
level.  
 
There was some attempt in early sociological work to indicate turning points in this 
ongoing process of a shift from pre-modern fatalism to modern probabilistic thinking and 
practice. Giddens (1991: 110) identified a partial intellectual challenge to fatalism in the 
notion of fortuna advanced by Niccolo Machiavelli, during the Renaissance. Early modern 
marine insurance is classically identified as the starting point of risk thinking and practice, 
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where the fate of ships· cargo was no longer left to the ¶gods· but became the subject to 
the calculation of an insurance contract, thus ¶taming· the future (Levy 2012).  
 
The interpretation and management of particular events mark further turning points, 
where the consolidation of underlying shifts away from fatalism become apparent. Natural 
disasters and disease outbreaks that historically would have been interpreted as divine 
punishment began to be understood in secular, causal terms. A widely-recognised 
departure occurred with the intellectual response to the Lisbon earthquake of 1755, when 
belief in disaster as an expression of divine agency faltered. Rather than being: ¶singular 
curiosities imbued with religious or political significance·, they became the object of 
scientific investigation ² a hazard whose probability of eruption could be, to some extent, 
calculated, anticipated and managed (Janku, Schenk and Mauelshagen 2012: 6). Giddens· 
suggestion that fatalism and morality have subsequently simply ¶evaporated· is an ideal 
type simplification. Even within contemporary ¶risk society·, ¶morality policy· remains 
intact around issues regarded as of first principle rather than instrumental issues of policy 
design (Knil 2013). Despite being formally determined in ¶evidence-based· terms, UK drugs 
policy, for example, remains effectively a ¶morality policy·. Illustrating this, policy advisor 
David Nutt (2009) was sacked for insisting upon the calculation of relative harms, 
challenging its basis in the anticipation of public outrage, arguing that alcohol was a 
greater risk than illegal drugs. There are further points of change, transition and 
resistance which can be usefully delineated in the contemporary period of risk politics. 
 
The historical conceptualization of Ewald (2000, 374) distinguishes a modern period 
concerned with occupational and social risk from the 19th century around workplace 
accidents and insurance, then a further distinct period from the late 1960s with the 
emergence of health, technological and environmental risk, initially in the United States. 
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One of the key texts of risk studies - Douglas and Wildavsky·s, Risk and Culture (1982) - 
focuses on this later period, exploring the new-found American preoccupation with, and 
contested politics around, environmental and consumer risk. Mohun (2012: 237) concludes 
her study of risk in the United States with this post-war era, identifying, among other 
factors, how in the highly charged and divisive environment of Cold War America, the 
politics of safety, security and protection provided ¶consensual distraction·. Risk politics 
were no more evident than in the ¶politics of precaution· that drove American regulatory 
policy from the late 1950s, until the pattern was reversed in the 1980s and Europe became 
instead defined by a precautionary approach (Vogel 2012). The Delaney Clause 
amendment to the 1958 Food Additives Amendment was the first fully precautionary 
regulation anywhere in the world. Driven by New York Congressman James Delaney, it 
stipulated that any chemical found to induce cancer in animals could not be approved for 
use in food. The ¶riskification· and politicization of chemicals was then consolidated with 
the publication of Silent Spring, Rachel Carson·s powerful attack on pesticides, which sold a 
million copies by the time of her death in 1964 and led to the banning of DDT - despite the 
campaigning of the chemical industry (Lytle 2007 164). Likewise, the UK AIDS campaign 
was driven by particular individuals and contested agendas, albeit under more 
demonstrably urgent conditions. 
 
The AIDS campaign was part of a more general reorientation towards managing risk 
initiated in the Tory administrations of the later 1980s and 1990s. Most immediately, a 
series of major accidents and disasters ² at football grounds and train stations, on ferries 
and oil rigs - struck in the late 1980s and 1990s which became defined as risks that could 
have been avoided, leading to public inquiries intended to prevent recurrence (Burgess 
2012). ¶%ODPH would once have been diffused, to local authorities, nationalized industries, 
private operators, even that old standby, acts of *RG· notes Simon Jenkins (2006: 137) in 
his account of the period, ¶%XW after a decade of personalized public administration, she 
6 
who had craved so much of the credit now had to take the EODPH· The Conservative 
administrations found themselves grappling towards new responses to issues that appeared 
to potentially threaten public health and safety in a changing climate of growing health 
preoccupation, less deference and a more defensive political class unfamiliar with such 
terrain. The climate was unpredictable as even issues that in the past that would not have 
been understood to merit a national government response, such as salmonella food 
poisoning, acquired a dynamic and became politicized.  
 
In an environment of perceived greater public anxiety about health and security ministers 
experimented with a more pro-active, anticipatory approach to what appeared to be new 
issues of public concern. Edwina Currie was a central figure in the AIDS drama as junior 
Health Minister, and pioneered a new engagement with, rather than denial of, risk. The 
year after the height of the AIDS campaign, in 1988, Currie announced on television news 
that, ¶:H do warn people now that most of the egg production in this country, sadly, is 
now affected with VDOPRQHOOD· (Booker and North 2007: 36). Her comments led to the 
temporary collapse of the egg industry, her own sacking, and went further in establishing 
a sense that taken-for-granted aspects of everyday life ² first sex, now food - were fraught 
with danger. Others, like dog ownership, were to follow. Another significant moment in 
the advance of a new risk politics was in August 1991 when, in a blaze of publicity, the 
then Home Secretary, Kenneth Baker, announced the Dangerous Dogs Act, in response to a 
single, highly publicized dog attack on a child. Thus, began another dimension to the 
newly evolving risk focus in British life; the over-responsive, ¶VRPHWKLQJ must be GRQH· 
action to eradicate everyday risks, that followed media campaigning (Burgess 2010).  
 
It was particularly within the field of health policy directly that a more proactive 
approach to everyday risk further evolved and questions of individual responsibility for 
lifestyle choices elevated. A new era in the evolution of public health, now known as 
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¶KHDOWK SURPRWLRQ· began in the 1990s and has subsequently intensified (Awofeso 2004).  
Reducing ¶OLIHVW\OH ULVN· for indeterminate ends became a matter of politics in a cross 
party consensus around health and security.  The ¶+HDOWK of the 1DWLRQ· white paper was 
announced by new Secretary of State for Health, Virginia Bottomley in 1992, with its 27 
targets on issues from teenage pregnancy to taking more exercise, in an expanded health 
agenda to ward off risk. The new politics of risk under the Thatcher and Major 
administrations culminated in the BSE crisis, where it eventually and shockingly transpired 
that ¶PDG cow GLVHDVH· ZDVQ·W confined to animals but also claimed human lives. 
Agriculture Minister John Gummer attempted a rear-guard action to downplay risk in a 
more traditional act of public reassurance (Booker and North 2007). But times had already 
changed in the new political environment and Gummer subsequently became a symbol for 
precisely how not to conduct risk politics. BSE was important in branding the 
Conservatives as outmoded and hostage to special interests against those of public safety, 
and an key  factor in their electoral defeat of 1997. The subsequent Labour 
administrations of Blair and Brown extended the politics of risk further as a managerial 
ethos, particularly around the new threat of terrorism which Blair deemed an all-
powerful, existential threat (Wilson 2009). -HQNLQV· (2006) account of the politics of the 
Thatcher/Blair/Brown years smartly identifies continuities, as a ¶UHYROXWLRQ in 3 DFWV· 
Something similar might be said of the risk politics that developed within this era, with 
AIDS as perhaps the first. 
 
The Two Faces of a ¶Remarkable· Campaign  
 
When I wrote the first draft of this article in the winter of 2016 it was thirty years since 
Margaret Thatcher·s Conservative government launched the ¶Don't die of ignorance· AIDS 
campaign. Few of my - now middle aged - contemporaries vividly recalled the ¶scary· 
advertisements with volcanos, icebergs and coffins that left the novel and lingering 
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association of sex with risk and death. ¶There is now a danger that has become a threat to 
us all,· intoned the actor John Hurt ominously in the voiceover for one of the two 
television advertisements. ¶It is a deadly disease and there is no known cure.· The word 
etched on to a blackened grave were then revealed: AIDS. Most notorious was the ¶volcano 
commercial· which featured a dramatic eruption of no obvious disease relevance. The 
advertising agency copywriter responsible has since described the ¶bemused· public 
response to its repeated showings (Thompson 2017). 
 
The public campaign was unprecedented in scale and budget. As well as the notorious 
commercials, there was simultaneous publication of full page adverts in all the Sunday 
newspapers and a national leaflet drop - to 23 million households, in early 1987. This was 
despite the fact that the disease remained rare at the time, with around 1000 deaths - 
almost all among specific high risk groups, primarily male homosexuals. There was no 
research suggesting the campaign message would be effective, and criticism contested the 
lack of specific information (in the television ads, if not the leaflet), ¶as if the disease 
could be caught from hewing granite or cruising the North Pole· (in reference to the 
iceberg and gravestone commercials) (Karpf cited in Berridge 2002: 131). Here in the 
campaign risk language was being used as a ¶forensic resource· to signal moral danger (see 
Douglas 1990; Lupton 1993 for discussion of such use). Even today the use of such dramatic 
methods ² however noble the intention - remains contentious. Explaining the persistence 
of prejudice about AIDS within schools, a campaigner recently explained that: ¶The 
problem is that many of them got their information about HIV from the notorious Aids 
campaign of the 1980s«· (Moorhead 2015). Another recent survey found the HIV myths 
that 'endure from the 1980s', not effectively challenged by the campaign (BBC 2016). In a 
2015 survey, young participants were shown the adverts for the first time (Q-Step 2015). 
Whilst 73% agreed the government was right to launch the campaign and only 7% disagreed 
(even with knowledge of the relatively small numbers affected), only 40% agreed they 
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were right to ¶use such dramatic imagery·, and 32% thought the campaign should have 




It is difficult to now recall the actual context, thirty years ago, and the unique nature of 
the challenge policy makers perceived. Berridge (2002) identified a first phase of 
governmental reaction from the early 1980s to late 1985 as one of ¶policy making from 
below·, when groups of experts and campaigners were drawn into reflection on the 
disease and a departmental consensus established AIDs as a national priority. In a second 
phase between late 1986 and early 1987, this consensus was projected into a moment of 
threat comparable to a state of war, communicated through the deliberately shocking 
adverts. This, the moment of the ominous adverts, saw the disease, ¶officially established 
as a high level national emergency, as a national crisis on a par with the Falklands or the 
Second World War·, as it was treated as an epidemic which if not countered could 
overwhelm the nation (Berridge 2002: 7). This moment of collective fear was short-lived, 
however. Berridge (2002: 82) described it seeming like a century between this period and 
only a few years later. She recalled a speech from a director of social services in the early 
1990s recalling that in 1986 there was a consensus amongst experts that half population 
would have AIDS by the end of century, but that when he made this remark only 5 years 
after it evoked laughter from the audience.  
 
Some of the elements that combined to create an almost apocalyptic mood were, firstly, 
that the disease was not fully understood and had no known cure or effective treatment, 
as the campaign stressed. In an emergency parliamentary debate on 21 November 1986 
10 
the minister with overall responsibility for health policy and leading the campaign as 
Secretary of State for Social Services, Norman Fowler, announced a campaign budget of 
£20m, on the basis that ¶information (was the) only vaccine available· (Hansard 1986). The 
spectre of a new infectious disease continues to haunt medical authority both in the UK 
and internationally, and this justifies extraordinary measures in their eyes. The new virus 
in 2003, SARS, for example, led to the World Health Organization announcing a global 
state of emergency and isolation of countries with even only a handful of cases. The 
conventional strategy of isolation and quarantine that effectively managed SARS made 
little sense in dealing with AIDS, however. The nature of the disease made compulsory 
screening pointless, not least as the virus remains in the person for life and is not 
contractible through everyday contact. Stigmatization made little sense on a wider level 
unless banishment of those with the virus was to be implemented. In any case, it is widely 
recognised that any such approach undermines ability to monitor and control the disease 
as individuals infected by the virus would have strong incentives to conceal their HIV 
positive  status. 
 
There was a wider sense of uncertainty as medical authorities had little knowledge of the 
sexual habits of high risk groups and the potential for further spread into the heterosexual 
population, as occurred in the developing world (Epstein 2007). Even if it were to be 
confined to the male gay population there was no accurate data on their numbers or 
habits (Overy, Reynolds and Tansey 2009:8). It is also important to bear in mind the 
general ignorance and incomprehension that prevailed at this time about gay lifestyles; 
Norman Fowler (2015) himself later recalled how he had to be educated about them, and 
the lack of knowledge was an important aspect of the uncertainty about the likely 
patterns of disease spread. In addition, it began to emerge that it was not just male 
homosexual who were ¶at risk·. By mid-1983 it had become clear that haemophiliacs were 
contracting the disease, and while the media could attribute infection amongst 
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homosexual men to immoral behaviour, haemophiliacs  were clearly ¶innocent victims· 
infected by contaminated blood  supplied through state agencies, a problem that occurred 
internationally (Berner 2007). In any case, blood dominated public perception at this time 
and led to a widening sense of who might be at risk from AIDS. 
 
Alongside this, and of greater professional concern, news arrived of much higher and, 
crucially, more general heterosexual pattern of infection in Africa. Once confirmed, the 
Chief Medical Officer who coordinated the campaign alongside Norman Fowler, Donald 
Acheson, describes the ¶bombshell· of the news that the disease was ¶spreading like 
wildfire in the general population· in African societies:  
 
I was horrified. If this could happen in Africa what would an identical virus do in 
Britain? Having decided that it would be folly to assume that in the UK HIV/AIDS 
would continue to be confined almost exclusively to gay men, I sought an urgent 
appointment with my political boss, Norman Fowler (Acheson 2007: 184) 
 
This new evidence was important in swaying the campaign towards a general population 
campaign - rather than the earlier separate campaigns for homosexual and heterosexual. 
Whilst Acheson made clear that epidemic was likely to develop more slowly in UK than in 
Africa, he argued it still constituted a real emergency under the prevailing conditions of 
uncertainty and this justified a population-wide campaign. In the November emergency 
debate in Parliament, Norman Fowler explained that the campaign:  
must be directed at the general population rather than at the groups which currently 
had the highest incidence in order to prevent an American or African type of 
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situation in the UK«balance had to be struck between warning everyone without 
causing unnecessary panic (Hansard 1986).  
Even in the midst of a ¶warlike· response, there remained a degree of paternalistic 
restraint, however, indicated by the government·s rejection of the ¶anyone can get it· 
messages originally suggested by the advertising agency put in charge of the campaign. 
 
There were other factors beyond the character of the disease itself that explain the 
extent and character of the reaction. Likely projections of the disease toll based on 
American trends don·t easily explain the reaction as these didn·t suggest a population-
wide epidemic. Other imperatives were at play, reflected in the intrinsically odd slogan, 
¶Don·t die of ignorance· - something which nobody had ever, or was ever likely to do, in 
any literal sense. The slogan emphasised education through attacking ¶ignorance· as 
important as the disease itself. At the time of the campaign, even professionals such as 
nurses believed that the disease could be spread by everyday contact, and threatened to 
refuse treatment and contact as a result. Ignorance encourages fear and the government 
reaction was more broadly informed by concern with how public fear may make treatment 
of this ¶minority· disease more difficult and even threaten ¶moral panic·. Whilst the 
spectre of a widespread anti-homosexual backlash may seem fanciful in 2016, 1986 was a 
very different time and place in the UK. 
 
There was the sense of an impending ¶plague· in 1986-7. Just as difficult to now recall in a 
Britain with legalised gay marriage that·s relatively at ease with public discussion of 
sexuality, was the extent of hostility towards homosexuality and, more broadly, the 
general ignorance of sex that still prevailed in the 1980s. This dimension leads to 
reflecting back upon an equally important, but largely forgotten dimension of the 
campaign. Homosexuality remained stigmatized in the UK, even as other aspects of 
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culture had been liberalized and decriminalized in the 1960s (Davies 1975). The late 1980s 
marked a high tide in a resurgence of explicit public moralism in a backlash against the 
perceived liberalism of the 1960s, usefully documented across a range of issues in British 
Social Attitudes survey responses from 1988 (Jowell, Witherspoon and Brook 1988). Most 
relevant here, fully two thirds of respondents were in favour of government AIDS messages 
telling people that some sexual practices were morally reprehensible, and almost a third 
said that the disease was a ¶punishment to the world for the decline in moral standards·. 
The proportion of those who considered that homosexuality was ¶always or mostly wrong· 
rose from 62% to 74%. In this sense, the notorious Section 28 of Local Government Act, 
passed in 1988, preventing councils from ¶promoting· homosexuality was in keeping with 
the predominant public inclination.  
 
During the week of the leaflet drop, the Chief Constable of Greater Manchester James 
Anderton publicly spoke of gays being in a ¶cesspit of their own making·, attacking any 
need to recommend condom use (cited in Turner 2013: 211). As part of the Sun 
newspaper·s campaign against what the paper claimed was a gay-led ¶hoax of the century· 
to deceive the population, columnists suggested ¶awkward solutions· of ¶outlawing 
homosexuality«quarantining AIDS sufferers and chemically castrating anyone who is HIV 
positive· or tattooing them. As late as 1990 another tabloid, the Daily Star still spoke of a 
self-created disease of ¶poofters [male homosexuals] and junkies· (cited in Beharrell 1993: 
207). Behind this hostility lay ignorance among the general public about sex-related issues 
that now seems astonishing. Sex survey researchers of the time recall how people lacked 
any sexual vocabulary ² particularly any formal one ² not understanding even what 
¶vaginal· sex was, or what it actually meant to be ¶homosexual· (Overy, Reynolds and 
Tansey 2009). In such an environment, politicians identified the potential for hysteria as 
the key challenge to address, as Michael Meacher did in explaining Labour Party support 
for the campaign during the emergency debate (Hansard 1986). As Berridge observed: 
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A national response was ministers· main preoccupation« heading off demands for 
action which might have victimized those with aids or alienated minority sexual and 
ethnic groups. (Berridge (2002: 134) 
 
The other, largely forgotten side of the Conservative AIDS campaign was how it sought to 
inform and even challenge misconceptions in an open way that was, in its context, quite 
bold, particularly for a Conservative administration. Recalling the main campaign slogan, 
this was a campaign formulated against ¶ignorance· ² something which one could ¶die of·. 
Alongside the dramatic and arguably misleading television adverts the leaflet delivered to 
householders carefully debunked myths about how HIV could be contracted and explained 
that whilst mainly confined to high risk groups it had the potential to spread more widely, 
depending upon behaviour. The close working relationship between the principal minister 
in charge, Norman Fowler, and the chief medical officer indicated how this was a 
campaign closely informed by developing evidence, as Norman Fowler continued to 
emphasize both in conversation and in his more recent account of managing AIDS  (Fowler 
2014). In today·s language it was ¶evidence-based· ² though partially also driven by policy 
concern to avoid a backlash against stigmatized groups.  
 
AIDS was managed as a matter of risk, not morality, to be combatted pragmatically not 
ideologically. Fowler declared in Commons debate that: ¶government did not have time 
for the luxury of a moral argument· (Hansard 1986). In a different indication of the 
campaign ethos, the Chief Medical Officer, Donald Acheson (2007: 197) recalled in his 
memoirs how pleased he was that insurers had been persuaded to simply use an HIV test 
to set premiums rather than identify those in high risk group through questions about 
sexual orientation. Acheson endorsed policy based on amoral risk factors rather than 
potentially discriminatory judgements about lifestyle, though there remained an uneasy 
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tension between the two. With some difficulty the campaign did not even commend 
sticking to one sexual partner, but rather stated that if an individual had more than one 
partner they should wear a condom as protection. The emphasis was upon harm reduction 
rather than moral judgement and this was most clearly illustrated by the introduction of 
needle exchanges in 1985 to minimize risk to intravenous drug users, in an implicit 
acceptance of illegal drug addiction still controversial today. Above all, the campaign 
resisted calls for compulsory screening heard in some section of the Conservative Party 
and beyond. This was an approach to risk in the more epidemiological and probabilistic 
sense, rather than only as danger. Practicing safe sex - using condoms and avoiding 
multiple concurrent partners ² was the central message of a campaign that made it 
commonplace to talk openly about sex for the first time.  
 
Historical and policy analysts see UK AIDS policy as innovative and quite at odds with the 
moral climate of the time. Patricia Day and Rudolf Klein (1989) analysed the response in 
the context of British state policy making more generally, and argued it exemplified its 
dynamic rather than static character. They were particularly struck by its ability to 
engage ¶outsiders· from gay groups and clinical specialties, governed by a deferment to 
expertise. They were further impressed by how little impact the populist moral backlash 
against homosexuals had on policy making, illuminating the ¶power of professionalism·. 
Other accounts emphasize the distinctively amoral character of the campaign. Turner·s 
recent account of the 1980s simply stated: 
the fact that a Conservative government was prepared to see the problem as being 
medical rather than moral«was in itself a remarkable development. [Turner (2013: 
212) [emphasis added]. 
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Colleagues of mine in social science and health studies recall this as the first time they 
were invited into consultation with government. The Medical Research Council 
commissioned leading gay academic, Anthony Coxon to undertake a major study of the 
sexual practices of gay men, for example. The result was a major longitudinal study of gay 
men and HIV/AIDS called Project SIGMA, which informed government and World Health 
Organisation policies at the height of the epidemic. Others working in the third sector 
identify it as the one moment when the UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, somewhat 
inexplicably, did something positive from their point of view. For them, this was a 
moment akin to David Cameron, the Conservative Prime Minister from 2010 to 2017 
sponsoring legislation legalising gay marriage. The experience remains of sharp policy 
relevance more broadly; for example, among campaigners for harm reduction approaches 
today in areas like drug policy reform. As Tracey Brown, a former member of the UK Drug 
Policy Commission observed of Thatcher·s ¶AIDS moment· that:  
We used it a lot at the UKDPC to try to cut through the liberal polarisation over 
drugs, reminding Tories that it was their government that brought in harm reduction 
measures in order to show them they had a legacy to lay claim to in current issues. 
(Brown personal correspondence 2016)  
 
Overall, there were two, in some views contradictory, elements to the campaign: an 
alarmist form and measured, informational content. As part of the British Library·s 
retrospective on propaganda, one academic illustrated this simply through an analysis of 
the notorious adverts themselves, contrasting their ominous images and dramatic music, 
with the accompanying calm, sombre voice that simply stated the facts (Graham 2013). 
Criticising their ineffectiveness, she favourably contrasted them with later campaigns that 
drew upon humour and intimacy, while not ignoring actual AIDS victims in the process. 
What is forgotten here, however, is that these later campaigns intended to familiarise the 
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public with condom use were conducted outside the heat of the crisis moment in late 1986 
and early 1987. Further, the shocking commercials were intended to be a temporary 
means of directing more considered attention towards the leaflet drop. 
 
Substantively what is interesting is how in its underpinnings the campaign developed a 
hybrid approach. In contrast to the United States where a conventional biomedical 
emphasis on cure and treatment was preferred by activists as it refocused attention away 
from ¶immoral· behaviours, epidemiological notions of ¶risk group· remained influential in 
the UK (Hoppe 2014). But this had to undergo modification and underplaying given the 
implications that: 
 There was«a thin definitional line between the epidemiologists· concept of risk and 
the lay interpretation in terms of blame and moral responsibility. (Berridge 2002: 31)  
What emerged was a hybrid approach that emphasised risky behaviours rather than ¶at 
risk· or ¶in danger· groups combined with an emphasis upon rights and liberties, cast 
against the prevailing climate of prejudice. Whilst still strictly accurate (anyone could get 
AIDS though were unlikely to do so given the sexual practices of the majority), the 
implication was to cast the net of vulnerability widely with the suggestion - in the adverts 
particularly - that we were all ¶at risk·, a phrase and notion of generalised vulnerability 
that was to become influential more widely in society from this time. 
 
However necessary, the campaign did not sit comfortably with the predominant public 
mood and a sense of betrayal is evident from Thatcher·s fervent constituency. Supporters 
expressed surprise and concern at Thatcher·s confusing turnaround from apparent 
champion of ¶Victorian values· to advocate of harm reduction and acceptance of immoral 
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behaviours. The Mail on Sunday attacked her for their apparent abandonment, 
complaining:  
 
From the woman with the whip to the lady with the lamp. AIDS will see to it 
that Mrs Thatcher will be remembered as the Jonny Appleseed of the Permissive 
Society, graciously scattering free needles and cut price condoms in her wake. 
Very nice, I·m sure, but where does this leave her natural constituency«? (cited 
in Berridge 2002: 134) 
 
It is interesting to examine how the Prime Minister was able to square her ¶amoral 
moment· with the prevailing climate and her orientation and  why did such a ¶remarkable· 
policy initiative apparently leave so little legacy, with harm reduction approaches in 






Overcoming ¶Victorian Values·? 
The particular characteristics of the early AIDS epidemic, the lack of a treatment or cure, 
its uncertainty, its threat  to spread to the general population and the ¶moral panic· in 
some sections of the media provided the stimulus for a robust policy response but the 
course of the campaign was shaped by negotiation and politics. 
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It is firstly useful to provide some further context and dynamics for the ¶scary· side of the 
campaign, beyond the general resolution to communicate that this was more than just a 
disease affecting minorities. The ¶Don·t Die of Ignorance· campaign was not the first UK 
AIDS initiative. Since the official recognition in 1983 of a new deadly disease that could be 
sexually transmitted, the UK government had experimented with public information 
campaigns using traditional communication techniques such as booklets and telephone 
hotlines.  However the campaign  led to only 2,500 requests for the government booklet 
and 6,000 helpline calls. These early initiatives  were criticised for their obscurity and lack 
of impact. They were too ¶wishy washy· and psychologist David Miller reflected an 
emerging consensus that: ¶Unfortunately some people will have to be shocked if we are 
going to save lives· (cited in Berridge 2002: 89). When an advertising agency, TBWA, 
agreed to support the government with their health communication programme  they 
advocated  a more hard-hitting approach that drew upon the experience of their 1985 
anti-heroin where two television adverts directly targeted young people and dramatically 
illustrated the effects of losing control through drugs. 
The agency contribution to the AIDS was led by their advertising manager, Sami Harari, 
who advocated having ¶strong· messages about the dangers AIDS and in the Summer of 
1985 the agency  successfully experimenting with bolder messages with mention of ¶safe 
sex· from the summer of 1985.  Sami Harari was pushing for an AIDS campaign built around 
the message ¶Anyone can get AIDS·.  The Chief Medical Officer, Donald Acheson did not 
accept this approach as he felt it might encourage the belief that the disease could be 
contracted through everyday social interaction and he ¶wanted the campaign to inform 
with urgency, but not to be alarmist· (cited in Berridge 2002: 112). Initially the plan for 
the campaign was to have the ¶fear message· to capture the public interest so that people 
were prepared for the subsequent information leaflet.  The copywriter at advertising 
agency who was responsible for the campaign, David O·Connor Thompson (2017), stated 
that the notorious - ¶exploding mountain· - TV commercial was only intended to be aired 
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for one or two weeks as an alert for the impending leaflet drop, and the message would 
be reinforced by the statement on the front page of the leaflet: ¶Don·t die of ignorance ² 
declared  the leaflet that went on to outline existing knowledge about the disease. The 
advertising agency wanted the TV campaign to move on from the general fear message to 
more specific advice for ¶at risk· groups on ways in which they could change their 
behaviour to reduce their risk . However despite the support of the Secretary of State, 
Norman Fowler (2015: 7), the campaign remained constrained by the Prime Minister·s 
reluctance to directly and publicly engage with homosexual practice in the campaign·s 
messages and the second part of the campaign never took place. As David O·Connor 
Thompson (2017) has noted the TV campaign continued with the general fear message as 
¶with airtime booked, the only commercial available continued to run to the increasing 
bewilderment of the public· (Thompson 2017). However, the ¶don·t die of ignorance· strap 
line that  was not intended to be the primary message lingered and seemed to be   
effective in increasing public awareness of the threat of AIDS. Thus the most sustained 
alarmism of the campaign came about partly accidentally and because of reticence about 
direct political engagement with still morally controversial homosexual practice. 
 
 
Dramatic, targeted health and safety campaigns were far from unprecedented in the UK, 
beyond the annual, ever-more grisly Christmas drink- driving adverts watched annually 
since their launch in 1964. With the innovation of public information films by Richard 
Massingham from the late 1930s, the UK became the world-leader in dramatic ¶Public 
Information Films· about everyday dangers. Among the many such films during my 
childhood, I recall the grim reaper praying on those foolish enough to venture near quarry 
pools as vividly as the AIDS icebergs and tombstones! (National Archives). Further context 
for the AIDS adverts is provided through international comparison; the Australian AIDS 
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campaign (1987), for example, was much more graphic, with mothers and children being 
mown down by numerous ¶grim reaper· skeletons. The AIDS adverts were far from being 
either unprecedented or internationally unique. 
 
The AIDS campaign is particularly interesting as it was an innovative new policy approach 
that went dramatically against public sympathies but was also sponsored and implemented 
by a political party committed to traditional ¶conservative values· or ¶Victorian values·. 
However it is important to recognise that the barriers to an amoral approach being 
implemented by the Conservative Party were not so significant as subsequently imagined, 
as it was far from being defined by a sharp moral perspective in the way imagined by 
critics. The increasingly hapless Conservative administrations of the late 80s and early 90s 
stumbled into accusations of moralism. John Major who replaced Margaret Thatcher in 
1990, suggested at the 1993 party conference that the government ¶get back to basics·.  
This was intended to reassure the right of the conservative party of a return to 
Thatcherism in the ¶small state·, rather than ¶big morality· sense. But with the unwitting 
aid of Central Office media managers, the speech was spun by journalists into a moral 
crusade, ¶thereby rendering any departure from those basics a matter of supposedly 
legitimate public interest· (Bale 2011: 46). In this context innocuous-sounding ¶old values· 
were assumed to belie a more exclusionary purpose.   
Thatcher herself was an economic rather than social conservative and uncertain about the 
rightful scope of the government in moral domains and its chances of success.  
 
The longer term historical UK perspective - including the actual Victorian period ² provides 
further context, indicating that the campaign was less of an historical break and more 
consistent with established patterns than might be supposed. Thatcher·s values of thrift 
and responsibility were the ¶real· Victorian morality, not the one imagined by some 
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opponents as a convenient caricature. Far from being religiously intense in the manner of 
the Puritans, Victorian morality itself was increasingly secular. Secularised Victorian 
morality established an instrumental and utilitarian dimension that set it on a modern 
trajectory. Their morality of respectability was pervasive but also very practical, even 
banal. The famous quote of German historian, Treitschke, that the English ¶think soap is 
next to civilization· testified to a wider truth that, for Victorians, ¶cleanliness was next to 
Godliness·, as the aphorism went. Correspondingly, the medical historian Roy Porter 
(1986) noted how a punitive approach to the management of disease was already in 
decline by the beginning of the Twentieth Century. The spectre of widespread disease in 
the armed forces and society more widely demanded a pragmatic rather than moralistic 
response and this became the accepted approach within the medical establishment from 
that time, as historians were to remind politicians during the AIDS crisis. 
 
 
This is not to say that Thatcher was openly supportive of the new amoral approach. Fowler 
(2014: 3) makes clear that, ominously, ¶standing in the way of such an approach was the 
Iron Lady herself·, as he emphasised his role in challenging her. We will never know for 
certain what her views were, as there is no mention of the subject in her many speeches 
or in her voluminous memoirs. But what is consistent with this silence, other recollections 
and a sense of her brand of traditional conservatism is the core belief that such matters 
were best dealt with more discretely; ¶not in front of the children·. Essentially, it seems 
she would have preferred a more targeted, not population-wide campaign, with sex-
related messages targeted away from the young, who need not be encouraged to consider 
such matters. Messages for victims of sexual disease, in her view, were best targeted at 
those most at risk, in the clinic. Like much of her constituency, she did not want to see 
television presenters demonstrating condom use during daytime television, as was to 
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become the new norm into the 1990s. In political terms, the new, open politics of health 
risk were not a fit subject for a minister; Fowler (2014: 12) has documented how she 
counselled against him becoming defined by such an issue suggesting it would be suicide 
for his political  career. 
 
A second factor behind the campaign·s success was that the Prime Minister allowed herself 
to be marginalised from the decision-making process, having tacitly approved the 
approach.  The campaign was steered through government and turned from a 
departmental consensus for action into a momentary national crisis by the Secretary of 
State for Social Serivces, Norman Fowler, closely supported by his Chief medical Officer 
Donald Acheson. Fowler claims to have been personally moved by his trips to visit victims 
in San Francisco and elsewhere (Fowler 2015) and to have been motivated  by a sense of 
injustice ² that it ¶ain·t fair·, as he puts it ² that an issue could be ignored because it 
mainly affected hidden, minority groups, (Fowler 2015). Berridge (2002: 76) outlined the 
political machinations behind the campaign, beginning with the informal alliance that 
developed from late 1983 between Donald Acheson and the Terence Higgins Trust around 
promoting the idea of potential homosexual spread. Donald Acheson ensured the support 
of the civil service by engaging senior civil servants such as Cabinet Secretary, Robert 
Armstrong.  Armstrong advised the Prime Minster to appoint a special Cabinet 
subcommittee to oversee the AIDS situation chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister, Willy 
Whitelaw.  This ensured that while the Prime Minister was kept informed she was  not 
involved in the details of the committee·s work.  The committee, which first met on 11 
November 1986 played a key role in supporting the development of a pragmatic AIDS 
policy.  In his interview with me in 2015, Norman Fowler acknowledged the key role 
played by Willy Whitelaw.  He said that Whitelaw had been an army commander in the 
Second World War and had extensive practical experience including managing the sexual 
diseases that were rife amongst service men.  Whitelaw was keen that the AIDS campaign 
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should be ¶pepped up· and hard hitting. Whilst the Committee avoided the direct scrutiny 
of the prime Minister, it brought together the key players in the government and reflected 
the growing sense of urgency about the AIDS epidemic.  While the work of Cabinet 
committees is usually kept secret, the outcomes of this committee were shared 




The AIDS campaign was driven by a sense of crisis comparable to wartime, and this is a 
crucial factor in understanding its progress and character. The wartime type response 
conditioned cross party support with the Labour Party, if anything, even more vociferous 
in demanding action through wartime analogy. For example the Labour Member of 
Parliament,  Willy Hamilton (cited in Hansard 1986) stated in Parliament that: 
 The spread of AIDS is as serious as, if not more serious than, what faced us in the 
Falkland Islands. The Prime Minister should go on television now and say: ¶"We shall 
solve this problem, no matter what the cost·. That would be a measure of the 
Government's seriousness. (Hansard, 1986)  
A civil servant who briefed journalist Peter Jenkins put AIDS on a par with nuclear war 
(Berridge 2002: 83). With such a sense of crisis, a liberal consensus was secured and the 
risk of a  moral backlash limited. 
 
What this allowed was an unusual political turn towards historical precedent and even 
historians themselves, and this substantiated the imperative for distancing policy from 
immediate moral pressures. During the intensity of autumn 1986, politicians called upon 
medical historians for advice in how disease had been managed in the past, notably  
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Dorothy and Roy Porter, internationally renowned specialists . The Porters· (Porter, 1986 
and Porter and Porter, 1988) message was clear. They argued that the historical evidence 
was  that punitive and repressive policies simply had not been effective in controlling 
sexually transmitted disease. Confidentiality rather than quarantine and stigmatization, 
had helped control syphilis and gonorrhea. The ¶enforcement of health· through measures 
such as the Notification of Diseases acts of 1889 were both ineffective and undesirable. 
They argued that there  was no reason to think punitive measures would control the AIDS 
epidemic. This is reflected in the important article Porter (1986) published in the British 
Medical Journal, ¶History Says No to the Policeman's Response to AIDS·. Norman Fowler 
(2014: 7) was aware of the historical evidence;, for example he discussed the failure of 
moral measures in the First World War with the appeals to soldiers to refrain from sex 
when they visited Paris and contrasted these with the success of more pragmatic measures 
such as the provision of prophylactic packs containing calomel ointment and the setting up 
of treatment facilities where troops could receive urethral irrigation within 24 hours of 
sex. 
 
The right wing  press in the UK unsurprisingly lacked any historical perspective and saw 
things very differently.  For example the tabloid newspaper,  the Sun, campaigned against 
what they claimed was a government pro-gay conspiracy to fool the British public into 
believing that AIDS could be contracted by ¶normal· heterosexuals (Beharell 1993). Even 
some of those involved in the policy process thought the threat of AIDS might have been 
exaggerated by the gay lobby in similar terms after the Winter wartime mood had passed. 
As one reported: 
 Some of the civil servants, I think, became a little wary of the issue. There was a 
feeling that perhaps they·d been duped: the media had stories about a ¶gay 
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conspiracy·, which had hyped AIDS to be more of an issue than it merited. (cited in 
Overy, L A Reynolds and E M Tansey 2009: 6). 
 
However there is no evidence of any conspiracy or an idea of how it might have been 
conceived or executed, and the campaign was relatively open to scrutiny. As I have 
indicated, the campaign - like any other political development - was a process without all-
powerful orchestration. The policy response to AIDS was shaped by a range of factors 
which made the disease a unique danger.  It was a new and incurable deadly disease 
which could not be managed through conventional public health measures; there was a 
lack of knowledge about the sexual and other behaviours that influenced the spread of 
AIDS; there was evidence that it was spreading rapidly in general populations in sub-
Saharan Africa; and conventional public health campaigns had made little impact on 
public awareness.  The campaign was shaped by a unique coalition of politicians that were 
willing to take action, the gay community that received itself to be under threat, public 
health experts alert to the danger of a new disease and an advertising firm that was 
willing and able to create a hard hitting campaign.  Invoking a wartime spirit this coalition 
was able to create a risk-based policy which sanctioned state intervention in intimate 
personal behaviour in a political context which appeared to favour a more moral and 





A Limited Legacy, but Broader Significance in the Emergence of Risk Politics 
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The direct impact, significance and legacy of the ¶remarkable· ¶Don·t Die of Ignorance· 
campaign has been limited. As I have observed, current drugs campaigners seek  to remind 
the Conservatives of some kind of legacy of harm reduction precisely because there hasn·t 
been one. The consumption of illicit psychoactive drugs remains governed by moral 
politics and even a self-evidently beneficial harm reducing measure such as encouraging 
smokers to switch to e-cigarettes remains contested as a potentially dangerous 
compromise (Klein 2013) 
 
The AIDS campaign is a curiously forgotten episode - besides the ominous adverts with 
which nobody is keen to identify and are regarded as, at best, a necessary evil in the face 
of a unique threat. This is despite standing out objectively as, at the very least, an 
uncharacteristic intervention and, for some, Thatcher·s finest hour. Yet it is not 
remembered as her ¶gay marriage moment· equivalent to Cameron·s, not least as she 
personally distanced herself from the policy. It was not only absent from Thatcher·s own 
memoirs, but even from those of Matthew Parris (2013), her openly gay and socially liberal 
former correspondence secretary. In this context, we can understand Norman Fowler·s 
somewhat frustrated attempts to remind us of the experience in his recent book and 
underline a pioneering legacy for himself and Donald Acheson. Edwina Currie also recalled 
it as a moment of which the Conservatives should be proud. In her 1989 memoirs she 
described how AIDS was not covered up or ignored, but: ¶tackled with vigour and vision in 
this country«nipped in the bud· (Currie 1989: 67). She emphasised how confidently 
conservative health ministers had responded to a crisis in conditions of uncertainty, as 
their: ¶leap in the dark was taken with a sure-footedness which augurs well for the 
future·. The campaign was indeed quite bold, particularly with regards to its 
unprecedented leaflet drop to all households nationally. It was also educational and based 
on a trust in the public as citizens who had the, capacity to understand  sexual matters if 
given the information and the will to take actions to protect themselves. Perhaps this 
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contrasts with the distrust that underpins some current policy initiatives that envisage 
that we can only be  
unconsciously ¶nudged· towards better outcomes (Burgess 2012). It eschewed moralism 
and remained substantially evidence-based even if it avoided addressing the specific risks 
facing specific vulnerable groups such as gay men and concentrating on the general risk 
facing the whole population , as they were compelled towards a general population 
campaign. It was driven by Fowler·s compassion and concern that minority victims would 
not be further stigmatised in an illiberal, even vicious cultural climate. 
 
Given the political significance of the 1980s AIDS campaign it seems strange that it did not 
bequeath a wider legacy of explicitly evidence-based and harm reducing interventions. 
One reason for the lack of legacy is that the campaign was not founded in these terms it 
was seen at the time as a unique response to a unique circumstance in which policy 
makers did not have time to moralize but had to create immediate and practical solutions 
to a potentially catastrophic threat. This did not mean that harm reduction became a 
preferred policy approach or that moralizing had been abandoned, as the Section 28 anti-
gay legislation passed in the following year suggested (there is an unexplored argument 
here that Section 28 can be understood as a sop to the Conservative·s natural 
constituency, reassuring them that they had not ¶gone soft· on homosexuality despite the 
AIDS intervention). Instead, the AIDS campaign was driven by a combination of distinctive 
pressures that overcame the usual concerns with appeasing perceived public and media 
anxiety about liberalization that still limit harm reducing initiatives in sensitive moral 
areas like drug reform. It was then steered through government insulated by a Cabinet 
subcommittee, away from potentially hostile critics such as the Prime Minster, Margaret 
Thatcher. Perhaps most importantly, once the sense of crisis vanished it was looked back 
upon with some bemusement, even embarrassment as an aberration, perhaps even a 
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moment when government and civil servants had been somehow hoodwinked, affirming 
the sustained critique of the Sun newspaper. Otherwise, what remained in the memory 
were only the adverts, which nobody was keen to claim as a legacy or blueprint for future 
interventions. In this context, the practical, harm reducing character of the intervention 
and its contribution towards recasting a more liberal Britain have been forgotten. 
 
It is difficult to assess the direct impact of the campaign. Donald Acheson (2007), the 
Chief Medical Officer at the time, was  balanced in his assessment; that whilst they had 
¶done the right thing·, it wasn·t ¶remarkable· in comparative terms. For him, the 
campaign: ¶stood the country in good stead...·, and the impact was largely proportionate 
to the UK·s relative risk exposure. Whilst the disease impact was: 
 not as low as occurs in the Scandinavian countries, it is lower than any other 
country with a colonial history in Africa and the epidemic due to intravenous drug 
abuse has been avoided·. (Acheson 2007: 197) 
This matter of fact and practical assessment is in keeping with the character of the 
campaign behind the adverts, usefully contextualizing national impacts within the UK·s 
historic ties with, and large numbers of immigrants from, what emerged as the African 
centre of the epidemic. The needle exchange programme and other initiatives among drug 
addicts were a notable credit, though these predated and were separate from the ¶Don·t 
die of ignorance· campaign itself. 
 
In comparative international context, it would be wrong to overstate the uniqueness of 
the UK response to AIDS. Similarly ¶professional· responses were evident in Sweden, 
Germany and even, to some degree, in the United States, as other countries also 
perceived a potential crisis and also responded clearly - some more quickly, others 
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regrettably more slowly (Fox, Day and Klein 1989). Despite hitting the American gay 
community earlier, a federal response was slower in the United States than in the UK. A 
similar leaflet to the British version called, ¶Understanding AIDS· was distributed there -  
but not until 1988, by which time some 45,000 had died (Lord 2009). A notable difference 
with regard to the harm-reducing character of the UK response is that the American 
leaflet recommended sexual abstinence, with condom use only endorsed for those not 
prepared to do so. Morally informed, stigmatizing responses even now remain at the state 
level in the U.S. Laws in 33 states retain HIV-specific criminal statutes: 
 enacted during the mid-1980s and early 1990s in the context of high AIDS-related 
mortality and a panic about its transmission. (Hoppe 2014: 140)  
More salutary is the case of societies that have continued a wholesale rejection of a 
pragmatic course. A moralistic, anti-gay refusal to practically confront the disease still 
prevails in Russia, for example. The country·s top AIDS expert has lambasted the Kremlin·s 
still conservative agenda, saying the HIV-AIDS epidemic is worsening and at least two 
million Russians are likely to be infected in the next five years. Vadim Pokrovsky, head of 
the country·s state AIDS centre, said the Kremlin·s policies promoting traditional family 
values have abjectly failed to halt the spread of the deadly virus (Agence France Presse 
2015). 
 
Within Europe, Fox, Day and Klein (1989) note a similar ¶power of professionalism· in 
Germany and Sweden as emerged in the UK. There was German federal funding of the 
AIDS groups as early as 1985. The German response more broadly was not dissimilar to the 
British, with the exception of conservative Bavaria. The difference in this respect was that 
the Conservatives relied upon the non-punitive approach recommended by medical advice 
despite an ideological hue akin to the Bavarians, and having to work through a centralised 
political machine rather than the devolved administration of federal Germany. The 
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comparison is an interesting one that draws out the coherence and evidence-based nature 
of the British response. Whilst: 
 In Germany political uncertainty produced a conflict between authoritarian and 
liberal ideologies; in the UK, uncertainty seems to have increased political reliance 
on professional knowledge and expertise. (Freeman 1992: 57)  
Within the campaign there began a long, painful and still continuing journey to politically 
manage crisis amidst uncertainty. A significant moment was initial official reluctance to 
admit that AIDS could be transmitted through blood on the basis that, as the then 
Secretary for State, Kenneth Clarke put it, ¶there is no conclusive proof that this is so·, as 
Edwina Currie later recalled. She intellectually recognised the importance of challenging 
this outmoded denial of uncertainty, and recalled challenging the logic that ¶no evidence 
(yet) means no risk· during parliamentary questioning. She remembered it as a moment of 
epiphany, one: ¶I shan·t ever forget«it·s engraved on my heart.· Frankly, she continued 
that: 
I suppose, if I·m being totally honest, there·s also the thought that if one of these 
liability cases goes badly wrong it could just be me that has to defend, sometime in 
the future. (Currie 2002: 53).  
Currie admitted that her care not to deny as yet uncertain risk was driven not only by 
foresight and recognition of the need for a new political style, but concern with avoiding 
direct responsibility and future blame. This message was only to really hit home with the 
Bovine Spongiform Encephalitis (mad cow disease) debacle of the later 1990s, however, 
after which ensuring that, above all, perhaps inevitable political mistakes around such 
¶wicked problems· of uncertainty don·t happen ¶on my watch· (Burgess 2004). 
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Looking at the wider impact of the population-wide campaign, the consensus is that there 
was no fundamental behavioural shift towards ¶safe sex· with condoms amongst the 
heterosexual population (Graham 2013). As there was no take-off in HIV infection among 
heterosexuals outside high risk groups the disease remained only frightening in the 
abstract. ¶Scare tactics· do not stimulate positive behaviour change (see Petrosino, 
Turpin-Petrosino and  Finckenauer 2000). The population-wide campaign also necessarily 
took attention away from the mainly-gay victims of the disease who remained publicly 
invisible apart from high profile celebrity deaths such as that of Freddie Mercury in 1991 
and Rudolf Nureyev in 1993 (Graham 2013). But the campaign did raise general awareness 
that the disease was contracted sexually rather than through everyday contact, as was 
previously widely assumed. And there·s reason to believe it contributed towards a blunting 
of anti-gay prejudice, marking a turning point in creating the more socially liberal values 
prevalent today. As Berridge concludes: 
 As well as advancing a liberal and non-punitive reaction to the syndrome, the 
Thatcher government effectively presided over a resurgence and reaffirmation of 
homosexuality, as well, to a lesser extent, an assertion of liberal attitudes towards 
drug use. (Berridge, 2002: 56) 
Whilst certainly not the only factor in a broader process of liberalisation, the campaign 
marked a turning point towards a Britain in which gay marriage could become legalised. 
 
Conclusion 
Returning to the broader theme with which we began, the history and increasing 
encroachment of risk thinking and practice is not only a long-term process driven only by 
systemic forces of modernisation and secularisation. Nor is it complete or even across the 
globe, indicating the need to consider developments within particular cultures, national 
contexts and in relation to particular issues and domains. The threat of epidemic disease 
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which once was predominantly understood in moral and religious terms now tends to be 
predominantly understood as a risk that might ¶tamed·. Early responses to AIDS illustrate 
the continued struggle to displace explicitly moral and fatalistic responses in an area 
where such sensibilities remained powerful. In the UK context, it marked the arrival of 
risk politics and policy making that aspires to govern individual lifestyle risk.  
 
Important shifts and turning points in risk history require closer analysis, allowing better 
understanding of the balance between continuity and change. The AIDS case illustrates 
that even significant breaks in the extent and character of government intervention are 
not without precedent, drawing upon historic policies to manage sexual disease among 
travelling troops during wartime. The abandonment of a fixed and explicitly moralistic 
approach was consistent with an increasingly pragmatic and empty formal moralism 
evident since Victorian times and only apparently revived under Conservative party ¶back 
to basics· from the 1980s. Nor was the sometimes shocking packaging of some of the 
campaign unprecedented either historically or comparatively. Yet a significant change 
occurred, with a population-wide campaign intended to change everyday sexual behaviour 
and self-awareness. The AIDS campaign involved adopting an evidence-based, calculative 
approach to limit the possibility of further stigmatization and backlash against minority 
groups. It was led ¶from above·, driven by the determination of particular individuals 
drawing upon new alliances, and involving difficult negotiation and resistance. 
 
It is difficult to now recall the novelty of the risk politics that emerged in the late 1980s, 
in a world where it has become relatively routine. Reducing ¶lifestyle risk· for 
indeterminate ends became matters for the state and government who are expected to 
concern themselves with promoting the prevention of future risk among the population. 
Complaints of a ¶nanny state· that should confine itself to its traditional socioeconomic 
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remit have been marginalised and the political landscape dominated by demands that 
government risk politics don·t go far enough.  An epidemiological emphasis upon risk 
factors was integral to the UK AIDS response and subsequently became central to the 
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